Power in society, economy, and mentality: Towards a semiotic theory of power by Siefkes, Martin
Semiotica 181–1/4 (2010), 225–261 0037–1998/10/0181–0225
DOI 10.1515/semi.2010.042 © Walter de Gruyter
Power in society, economy, and mentality: 
Towards a semiotic theory of power*
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Abstract
It is a well-known fact that power is closely connected with signs, but usu-
ally this connection is thought to be “after the fact”: signs representing a 
power whose origin could be understood in non-semiotic terms. In this 
paper, a different view is introduced: power is an inherently semiotic phe-
nomenon, which can be analyzed with concepts of cultural semiotics. To 
reach this aim, the three areas of culture defined in Roland Posner’s theory 
of cultural semiotics are taken as basis for definitions of three types of 
power: power of position, power of disposition, and power of interpreta-
tion. These main types of power are delimitated from each other, further 
differentiated and carefully examined in their semiotic as well as socio-
logical dimensions. The conclusion is reached that the full range of power 
phenomena can be analyzed with the help of cultural semiotics.
Keywords: power; authority; institutions; property; interpretation; cul-
tural semiotics.
1.  Introduction
Power has to do with signs; this is nothing new. In fact, in thinking about 
power we can be struck by the two-fold shape in which we encounter it: 
On the one hand it manifests itself as quite corporeal (all too real for the 
victims) when it is enforced as violence — e.g., a death sentence is carried 
out. At the same time, it demonstrates its subtlety as a sign relation when, 
for example, this same death sentence becomes valid through the applica-
tion of a stamp or is stayed when the stamp is missing. Thus throughout 
history individual documents have deployed power that affected the lives 
of hundreds of thousands; well-known examples are the Edict of Nantes1 
or the Edict of Fontainebleau.2 This duality in its appearance has been
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repeatedly understood as a paradox, because it has seemed nearly impossi-
ble to describe these two forms of power as a single phenomenon, to think 
together what we might call the “ethereal sign-nature” and the “corporeal 
force-nature” of power.
Semiotics can help us here. Though it is often just called the “study of 
signs,” semiotics is the study of sign processes and sign users as well. It is 
in this broader sense that it gains the ability to describe the society, econ-
omy, and spiritual state (mentality) of a particular culture; these tasks are 
taken up by cultural semiotics. Semiotics thus is the first science that of-
fers the necessary concepts and descriptive models for explaining power 
both in its aspect as sign process and in its aspect as social phenomenon 
shaping human relations, thereby illuminating the two-fold nature in which 
power manifests itself.
A further characteristic of power that has frequently prevented an in-
depth analysis is its apparent polymorphism as a social phenomenon. Let’s 
examine three examples that are usually considered to be power:
1. (a) A state president or (b) a well-known personality makes a state-
ment which, regardless of its argumentative quality, is covered exten-
sively in all media, and which will therefore, if it is not entirely im-
plausible, influence many people. A different person contradicts the 
statement in detail and on a high argumentative level, but their argu-
ment is only brought to the attention of a fragment of the influenced 
people, if at all.
2. A billionaire decides to build herself a luxury estate. She buys a large 
piece of property with a number of neighbors who are influenced by 
her activities, uses a lot of artifacts (building products and furniture) 
and determines the lives of many people for a certain time — namely, 
all those who are directly or indirectly involved in the construction.
3. The manager of a business, by signing his name onto a document, sets 
the firing of 10,000 employees into motion. For many of these people 
this means that they must look for a new employer as well as change 
the circumstances of their lives (due to a new job, a possible reloca-
tion, a different salary, etc.). For some of those affected, the manager’s 
decision means unemployment and a decline in their social position. 
Even the decision to employ someone is an exercising of power.3
These three examples show how different the ways in which power 
works are. At first glance, there is hardly any similarity between these 
three persons — except, for course, that we would ascribe power to them! 
Let’s compare the three cases more closely: The persons in examples (1) 
and (3) are well-known, and there might even be a protest against their ac-
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tions; in example (2) both would be atypical. In the case of (1a), those that 
feel affected by the statement can try to resist the power by electing a dif-
ferent president;4 in case (3) this is not possible. In (1a) and (1b) as well 
as in (3) an argumentation that throws doubt on the statement or decision 
may, under certain circumstances, be helpful, while in (2) the decision-
maker is not assumed to have to defend her decision; on the other hand, 
she uses up a part of her power (if she’s not careful, it might not be enough 
to finish the project), while in the other cases power stands to grow through 
its use. In the case of (1b) there are once again special rules; depending on 
the effect of the statement, power can be increased or decreased through 
its use.5
How can we place all these different examples under the same concept 
of power? The differences described — and the list could go on — seem 
to indicate that “power” can only be described generally, while more pre-
cise examinations of its meanings and characteristics produce an irreduc-
ible proliferation. Cultural semiotics, however, provides a way out of this 
apparent dead end: It allows us, on the one hand, to decipher more pre-
cisely the phenomenon of power; on the other hand, it will help us under-
stand the differences in the given examples. We will see that these are not 
incidental, but indeed indicative of three basic types of power (see Sec-
tions 4.1 to 4.3). These can be linked with the three areas of culture which 
are differentiated in cultural semiotics (see Section 3). We can thereby pre-
cisely distinguish the varieties of power from one another (see Section 5) 
and explain their differences as well as their mutual dependencies.
2.  Power
2.1. Towards a definition
A definition of power that has meanwhile become a classic is given by 
Max Weber in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economy and Society). For 
Weber, power is “every opportunity, within a social relation, to assert one’s 
own will even against resistance, regardless of what this opportunity is 
based on” (Weber 1956 [1922]: 1.28). Even more concise is the definition 
in the second volume of the same work as the “opportunity to force the 
behavior of others to one’s own will” (Weber 1956 [1922]: 2.542).6 This 
definition covers the desired area precisely enough and will be used here 
as the foundation of our definition.
It should be noted that many phenomena of power are discussed by 
Weber under Herrschaft (“rule”), which he understands as a special case 
of power and defines as “the opportunity that a particular command with a 
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specific content will be obeyed by a certain group of persons” (Weber 
1956 [1922]: 1.28). The advantage of the concept for Weber is that it sums 
up precisely the means and manner of implementation (through “com-
mand” and “obedience”), while the concept of “power” is “amorphous”; 
he then proceeds on the basis of this concept of rule to analyze the histor-
ical forms of statehood up to democracy (Weber 1956 [1922]: 2.541–
2.876). This seems to make little sense, since, used in this way, “rule” ap-
proximates to “state power,” which is by no means exercised through 
commands only.7 Indeed, Weber ignores the role of economic power in his 
discussion of state power, though he addresses it extensively in another 
context (Weber 1956 [1922]: vol. 1 ch. 2). It therefore seems better not to 
take up Weber’s differentiation between “power” and “rule.”
Allen H. Henderson discusses the lack of accord between different soci-
ologists on whether “actual power” or “potential power” should be used as 
the basic model for power of position (Henderson 1981: 9–10). Here, 
though, this distinction itself is problematic. This is because power is al-
ways based on a possibility: If a bank robber threatens a teller with a pis-
tol, does he only have power over the teller if he then demands money? 
Or, even, only if he actually receives money? Both seem implausible. The 
mere fact that he has a pistol and is holding it to the teller’s head creates 
a power situation. This can be seen, for example, in that the teller could 
begin to open the register even before an explicit demand was made to do 
so; despite this, no court would find him guilty of disloyalty.
“Potential power” only makes sense as a concept if it is used to refer to 
a power potential contained in a situation, which can either be realized, or 
not by the participants. “Potential power” exists, for example, if an em-
ployer, due to his shy behavior or for other reasons, does not actualize the 
power which he could have over his employees: He could fire his rebel-
lious employees, demoralize them with unpleasant tasks, or — if both of 
the above are prevented by legalities or corporate structure — at least de-
prive them of support, but his workers know that he won’t do so because 
of his personality. The structural asymmetry of the situation, which allows 
us to speak of power (cf. 2.2) is present; at the same time, there’s no “ac-
tual power”: The employees can allow themselves to behave, at least to a 
certain degree, as if their employer couldn’t get back at them.
If, on the other hand, I wanted to define “potential power” simply as 
power not directly and visibly used, I would no longer be able to ade-
quately describe power relations that always consist of the potentiality of 
an (punishing, rewarding, admonitory) event that might well be never real-
ized. I would then have to say that someone has more power when he uses 
his means of power (cf. 4.3.1) more extensively (let’s say, by giving more 
commands as an employer; by calling in the army as a president); whereas 
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I would in this case prefer to say that he has only used his power more 
decisively.
These problems can be solved by defining the concept of “power” as the 
opportunity to do something, namely to assert one’s will, as in the defini-
tions of Weber. As opposed to potential power, this formulation clearly 
shows that the existence of power is always defined through the possibility 
of its use, so that it is very real power even when not being exercised. If 
“power” is thus defined, we obtain for “potential power” the usage we 
have found to make sense, describing the potentiality of a power relation 
that might or might not be actualized.
2.2. Definition
Power does not have to be based on explicit means of exercising it; it can 
also be produced by an asymmetry of the situation.
On the other hand, not every asymmetry represents a case of power: The 
opportunities awarded by personal talents, capabilities or by competence 
cannot be included in a description of power sensibly. This should be clear 
from the fact that it is one of the hallmarks of the presence of power that it 
can be used to force the will of the power-holder independently of his 
competence; whereas the influence of competence might lead to a person 
convincing others to do as she thinks best.
It therefore makes sense to say of this asymmetry that it is based on 
conditions of social or institutional organization. Such an asymmetry shall 
be called a structural asymmetry.
Def: “Power” is defined as the sum of opportunities of a person to impose 
his/ her will on one or more people due to a structural asymmetry in a 
given situation.
Two further examples should make this distinction clear:
−  If a chronically ill patient requires a particular medication for his well-
being that is produced only by a particular company, a structurally 
asymmetrical situation arises and a power relation develops.
−  On the other hand, it is not a question of power in the sense of my 
definition if a pianist is able to draw all attention to herself while the 
concerts of her colleagues remain empty — provided that this situation 
is the result of the will of the concertgoers. To the extent that there is 
no structural asymmetry in the situation (such as one-sided media cov-
erage or advertising), the concertgoers can freely decide between the 
various possibilities; it is therefore the case that the differing levels of 
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success can be ascribed to natural authority (see Section 4.1.2) and not 
to power. The decisive factor here is that the situation itself is structur-
ally symmetric: In the example above, all pianists have had good train-
ing, they have all been written about, and they all have the opportunity 
to perform. If the pianist above is given more support because, for ex-
ample, she has placed herself under the tutelage of an important men-
tor, a structural asymmetry is produced: The fact that everyone is talk-
ing about her is now related to the fact that the situation was influenced 
by her having more prestigious performance opportunities, a larger 
media response, or a more famous orchestra as accompaniment. The 
pianist herself does not have power at this point (though she could ac-
quire it quickly if she becomes famous); her success is nonetheless a 
result of power.
The somewhat cumbersome term “structural asymmetry” is chosen here 
in order to designate a particular kind of asymmetry. An asymmetry is also 
present if the pianist is simply so much better that no one wants to hear 
her colleagues; this asymmetry, however, is introduced by the pianist her-
self. “Structural asymmetry” therefore is meant here to designate a situa-
tion that is, independently of behavior and of the abilities of the persons 
involved, already asymmetrical.
By the structure of a situation I mean all facts that are not person-
dependent, but can have an influence on the situation. Used in this sense, 
the structure of a chess game encompasses the pieces, the board, the rules, 
and the conventional varieties of the game. Additionally, the structure of 
the situation in a particular game of chess encompasses factors such as 
background noises and lighting. It is important to note that the structure of 
a situation can, naturally, be influenced by earlier behavior of the persons 
involved; a situationally specific analysis is therefore necessary.
If one accepts the definition of power given above, power is present, for 
example, in the case of a game if it has unequal rules, or when other facts 
generate a structural asymmetry in the situation, for example, when the 
wind is favorable to one player in a game of tennis. Compare this with 
another purely imaginary game: The astounding asymmetry that would 
emerge if I was to play against a Wimbledon champion would, unfortu-
nately, have little to do with power . . .
3.  Three aspects of culture
For an adequate semiotic description of power, a cultural semiotic ap-
proach that can describe society and culture as phenomena constituted by 
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sign processes is necessary. The cultural semiotic approach of Roland Pos-
ner shall serve as a basis here (Posner 2004). This approach makes a triple 
division of culture by differentiating between “social culture” (the range 
of sign users and institutions of a society), “material culture” (the range of 
artifacts of a culture), and the “mental culture” (the range of mentifacts of 
a culture). On the basis of this triple division the concept of power can be 
explicated. For that reason, we should look into it in more detail.
3.1. Social culture
The social culture of a society is considered to be its structuring into indi-
vidual sign users and their interaction, as well as groups of sign users and 
their interaction. Groups of individuals who are connected on a regular 
basis by sign processes and who can in their totality function as a single 
sign user towards the outside world are called institutions (Posner 2004: 
66).
For a long time, social culture was seen as the only, or at least most im-
portant, site of power and power relations. We will see, though, that this 
assumption falls short.
3.2. Material culture
The material culture of a society is considered to be the totality of its arti-
facts as well as the knowledge of their production and use (Posner 2004: 
67). The theory defines as an artifact everything that is the product of in-
tentional behavior, regardless of whether the result itself was intentional. If 
an artifact not only has a function, but is also a sign that carries a coded 
message, it is called a text of that culture (Posner 2004: 68). This includes 
impermanent signs such as musical or theatre performances.
3.3. Mental culture
The mental culture of a society consists of its mentifacts. Mentifacts are 
ideas and ways of thinking, concepts and interpretations present in a soci-
ety (Posner 2004: 70). Semiotically, these are codes and conventional 
signs.8 Examples of mentifacts are the following:
–  Languages and dialects
–  Scientific theories
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–  Conventionalized usage of elements with a given meaning in the arts 
(“aesthetic codes”)
–  Terms and concepts
–  Religious beliefs
–  Moral values
All codes that a society uses are mentifacts. Of importance is the distinc-
tion between primary codes (a language; a system of traffic signs; musical 
notation, etc.) and the secondary codes based on them (literary genres as 
well as styles of code usage in the arts and in everyday life; musical styles 
and performance practices, etc.). Every use of a code is a text.
Three examples should clarify the division between mentifact and arti-
fact (with the special case of text): A book is not a mentifact, but a text of 
a culture. Equally, an image or the facade of a house are also texts in this 
sense, because they all have coded meanings, and every artifact with a 
coded meaning in a particular culture is a text of that culture. All three are 
based on mentifacts, which is to say, on codes:
−  A book is based on language, arguably the most important code of
every contemporary culture, as well as on further, secondary codes, 
which I will call aesthetic codes, such as the code of literary genres 
and traditions to which it must always relate in one way or another (if 
only in repudiation); the code of literary language use (“style”) which 
it uses or (in some cases) expands; etc.
−  An image is based on similar aesthetic codes. The role of language 
(i.e., the establishment of a primary codes on the basis of which ex-
periments can be carried out) is here assigned to the code of represen-
tation (e.g., central perspective), various technical codes (e.g., painting 
in oil, fresco) and the knowledge of their utilization, colors and their 
partly conventionalized use, etc.
−  A facade is also based on a primary code: Here it is the repertoire of 
shapes such as windows, doors, gables, ledges, balconies, roofs, etc. 
Secondary codes based on the primary code, which can be more or less 
conventionalized, include architectural styles (e.g., Classical, Modern) 
and individual styles of single architects.
4.  Three types of power
From a semiotic perspective, the general phenomenon of culture can be 
divided into the aspects of social culture, material culture, and mental cul-
ture. In all three areas specific phenomena of power can be found. The 
chosen cultural semiotic approach allows us to describe these diverse phe-
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nomena of power on the basis of a semiotic description of the three areas 
of culture. The advantage of this method — giving a semiotic description 
of power on the basis of a semiotic approach to culture — lies in the fact 
that now phenomena of power can be described systematically, building up 
from a few clear-cut concepts, whereas at first sight they seemed too di-
verse for an in-depth analysis (see the examples in the introduction).
These three examples, in fact, were not randomly selected: It will be-
come clear that they correspond to different semiotic types of power, each 
of which is located in a different semiotic area of culture. Also, the differ-
ences noted between the examples are not random. Rather, they reveal that 
the three types of power have different characteristics. The strength of the 
cultural semiotic description of power reveals itself in its ability to give a 
clear-cut bottom-up analysis of these differences, which are empirically 
verifiable (see discussion in the introduction), requiring for this task only a 
few equally clear-cut basic concepts of cultural semiotics and the said 
three-area division of culture. In what follows, the three types of power 
will be detailed individually; the order of the cultural areas which form 
their basis will for reasons of presentation be reversed. In Section 4.1, 
power of interpretation will be dealt with, which is located in the area of 
mental culture (see Section 3.3); in Section 4.2 power of disposition will 
be dealt with, which is located in the area of material culture (see Section 
3.2); and in Section 4.3 power of position will be dealt with, which is lo-
cated in the area of social culture (see Section 3.1).
4.1. Power of interpretation
4.1.1. Definition
Def: “Power of interpretation” is defined as the sum of opportunities of a 
sign user of a particular culture to define and/or distribute mentifacts as a 
part of that culture’s mentality.
Power of interpretation is located in the area of mental culture.
The qualification “as a part of that culture’s mentality” is of importance. 
The capacity to define new codes depends to a great extent on education, 
intelligence, and talent of the individual; in itself, it is not yet a variety of 
power. It is, however, a prerequisite for the development of power of inter-
pretation. Its creation depends on various factors that enable the distribu-
tion of new codes. These include the following:
–  Media access (the opportunity to use a particular medium, as a sender)
–  Media presence (the extent to which one has media access)
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–  Media competence (the degree to which someone knows how to use a 
medium for his/ her purposes)
–  Expert response (the reaction of the experts or critics, as they are called 
in the arts)
–  The size of the circle of acquaintances who can be “directly” 
influenced.9
What are mentifacts? According to Posner these include the following:
–  All the codes of a society
–  Its ideas
–  Its general concepts (for example “human” and “animal,” “heaven” and 
“hell”)
–  Its values (for example “freedom” and “equality” or, more up-to-date: 
“personal responsibility”)
Such mentifacts can be understood as codes, first, because there must be 
something that expresses them (a “symbolic form” in the sense of Ernst 
Cassirer), which is to say, a signifier; and second, because the connection 
of this signifier to a signified is of a conventional nature (Posner 2004: 
70): The arrangement of meaning could be different.10 They thereby fulfill 
the requirements for codes.
A central problem for the understanding of this type of power is the dif-
ferentiation between power of interpretation and natural authority.
4.1.2. Natural authority versus power of interpretation
Def: “Natural authority” is defined as the sum of opportunities of a person, 
based on past actions and achievements in a particular area, to find for the 
texts and/or mentifacts they produce in others on the one hand an interest, 
i.e., the willingness to receive them, on the other hand acceptance, i.e., the 
willingness to be prejudiced in their favor.
The natural authority of a famous writer thus consists of the fact that many 
people want to buy his new book, and the natural authority of a physicist 
of the fact that her new theory is, regardless of its first impression, care-
fully examined by the scientific community.
Natural authority is closely related to the concept of “reputation,” which 
designates the opinion all the people who know (about) a person have of 
this person, insofar as it is based on certain achievements, abilities or char-
acter traits of this person. Thus, “reputation” means just that part of the 
general opinion that is based on personal life and work, and excludes so-
cial standing (which is not to say, of course, that it is always fair!). It is 
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part of the reputation of someone if it is generally assumed that “he plays 
very well,” but not that “he is very well connected” or “she is a professor.” 
It should be noted that “reputation,” in this sense, can only usefully be 
employed in speaking of groups of people who are reasonably well- 
informed about other people’s achievements, as in scientific communities, 
work groups, close-knit communities etc. On this basis, “natural authority” 
can be said to be the direct influence people have on other people based 
solely on their reputation.
It is important to note that natural authority is not a moral category and 
has nothing to do with “real value,” whatever that may be. Artists, intel-
lectuals or “stars” of every description do not gain natural authority be-
cause they are “good” in any objective sense, but only because the audi-
ence likes them. A writer like Joyce didn’t get much recognition from most 
readers of his time even though he is now considered to be one of the 
most innovative and brilliant authors; he never had great natural authority 
in his lifetime, though he gained some through critical recognition. In ad-
dition, it should be pointed out that natural authority often accords its 
holders power of interpretation, when, for example, a film star is asked 
for her opinion on politics where s/ he has no record of achievement
whatsoever.
The distinction between power of interpretation and natural authority is 
important for the following reasons:
1. Natural authority is sometimes taken to be a form of power and can in 
fact be hard to distinguish from it, for example in the case that a su-
perficial utterance produces a large reaction, and is then discussed in-
stead of more substantial utterances by other people. The difference to 
power, however, can be seen in the fact that it is precisely in the ab-
sence of power that natural authority comes into play, whereas in the 
presence of power, the distribution of resources (in our example, at-
tention) is regulated by laws, conventions or by decisions of the pow-
erful. As a cross-check, it can be shown that power is necessary to 
prevent the effect of natural authority: The attempt to create an equal 
reaction to every utterance, for example by producing an identical 
print run for every author or giving each published book exactly 
twenty lines in the Arts and Leisure section, would certainly be feasi-
ble only with a decisive use of power. The use of power is even clearer 
if natural authority is to be excluded in personal relations, as in very 
conservative societies where there are strict rules regarding the rever-
ence people have to show other people depending on social position, 
and choices cannot be made according to the workings of natural 
authority.11
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2. Natural authority and power of interpretation lead to outwardly similar 
results, for example stronger media presence.
3. Natural authority is self-regulating, while power of interpretation is 
not. If an author follows a strong book with a weak one, one can as-
sume that it will receive more attention than it deserves (and vice 
versa); this will even itself out, however, with the following book.
By a person’s authority I mean the probability of others doing what s/ he 
wants, but with this doing based not on a structural asymmetry in the situ-
ation. The second part of the previous sentence distinguishes authority 
from power.
Natural authority should be carefully separated from artificial authority. 
As artificial authority I define any authority that is not natural in the sense 
of the above definition. For example, the authority of a teacher is partly 
artificial authority. Of course, teachers can, like any other person, develop 
natural authority on the basis of their capabilities, personality, or previous 
behavior. Usually, the authority a teacher can muster consists — apart 
from the power of position that results from the asymmetry in the teacher-
pupil situation (see 4.3.2) — of both kinds of authority, but they can be 
separated. Artificial authority can be removed by abolishing the social 
markers it rests on, for example titles, functions or prestigious posts. The 
authority that remains is natural authority. Thus, some people are “born 
teachers” and will gain respect in every teaching situation, formal or infor-
mal; an able scientist will have the reverence of colleagues even after los-
ing his/ her job.
As already mentioned, in normal teaching situations power of position, 
natural and artificial authority work together. But when the pupils meet 
their teacher after completing or changing school, the respect they show 
will be based only on authority since the teacher/pupil situation with its 
structural asymmetry has ended. If the same person lived in a community 
where social functions like “teacher” were unknown, her abilities and per-
sonality alone — natural authority — would define the respect she com-
manded in teaching.
Again, it is important to note that this is not a moral distinction; thus, 
natural authority in the sense of our definition includes the effects of 
character traits, personality, and even deception and dazzling on others, 
whereas other people are brilliant or morally good, but are not able to 
make an impression on their surroundings and win natural authority. At the 
same time, artificial authority is not to be discounted as invalid in princi-
ple. Regarding our example, many teachers do a good job with the help of 
artificial authority, whereas they would be helpless without it, having a 
personality that makes little impression on pupils.
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4.1.3. The production of mentifacts. The production of mentifacts takes 
place in various areas of society. In modern Western societies two areas 
are especially noteworthy: one is the universities; the other is the area 
which, in Germany, is traditionally designated as Kultur [“culture”] in a 
more narrow sense (for example when a newspaper has a Kultur section 
which includes art, literature, theatre, etc.), the area of artistic activity of 
individuals and institutions which in English typically is called “the arts.”
Imagine a university that uses only available mentifacts (codes or con-
ventional signs; see 3.3), failing to develop any new ones; it would proba-
bly be called “unscientific” and its status as a university might be disputed. 
For a high school, on the contrary, no development of mentifacts would be 
expected. In Germany, at college level traditionally the Fachhochschule 
was thought to provide a rapid, discipline-specific and efficient academic 
education, whereas the Universität in the tradition of Wilhelm von Hum-
boldt was meant to combine a “universal,” interdisciplinary education with 
a focus on research and creativity. Due to university reforms of the past 
years, however, a rapid convergence is taking place.
Codes are also created in the field designated Kultur in the more narrow 
sense. Here experimentation can and should take place as freely as possi-
ble from direct necessities. Though often a code or many codes are already 
available in a particular area, the cultural accomplishment is more highly 
valued the more innovative its code is. Schools of thought form around the 
question of whether one code or the other is preferable, and they battle 
each other in publicly interesting ways. But old codes have their followers 
as well; who see themselves as “conservative” and are of the opinion that 
innovation should not be taken too far.
But mentifacts are also created in other areas of society. Businesses 
develop new methods for solving technical problems and register these 
methods as patents; such methods, despite their practical character, are 
also mentifacts to the extent that they create new codes, new signs or new 
usages of them. In addition, businesses access the mentality of a society 
through the modern concept of trademark, i.e., the right to exclusive deter-
mination of certain signs by certain people. Other sign users are the ad-
dressees of these signs, but they are not allowed to use these signs (as 
senders) without permission of their owners in certain areas of society. 
Their use is especially prohibited in a negative context. The concept pre-
supposes the possibility of separating the creation of a sign (the determina-
tion of the connection between signifier and signified) from its passive 
consumption, a separation that does not take place in natural language and 
other largely self-regulating codes.
Since, however, these business signs (trademarks) have become of 
fundamental importance for the culture of a capitalist society, artists 
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especially find these restrictions to be a massive threat to “artistic free-
dom,” which in their opinion has to include the free use of all signs rele-
vant to a particular society. Other people feel that everyone who is the 
addressee of a sign should have the right to be its sender, too.12 Special 
forms of protest have therefore developed against trademark authority, for 
which there are even specific publications.13 Whatever one’s opinion in 
this question, it cannot be denied that the idea that signs can be owned in-
troduces power into a community of sign users, since it creates a structural 
asymmetry of the situation (see 2.2) by giving sign users different rights 
over the signs they communicate with.
Mass media and advertising are also becoming increasingly important as 
producers of mentifacts. It is important to note, though, that the contents 
produced by them, like those of the field of culture in the narrow sense, 
are primarily texts. Initially, media and advertising limited themselves for 
the most part to text production, but with growing competition they see 
themselves more and more as producers of mentifacts and are becoming a 
serious competition for traditional mentifact producers (universities and 
the arts, see above; and also churches, governments, and philosophy). They 
therefore develop new types of programs and campaigns, which are meant 
to function as new codes in society. Examples of successful mentifacts of 
this type include the “Big Brother” show, which changed the conceptual-
ization of the private/public distinction and the limits of self-presentation 
in many countries, and the German advertising slogan Nicht immer — aber 
immer öfter! (not always, but ever more often), introduced by the bre-
wery Radeberger to indicate the alluring qualities of their beer, which (due 
to its general applicability) for some time became a ubiquitous popular 
dictum.14
In many areas of daily life, new codes or new signs are generated inside 
existing codes; frequently, small, informal groups of sign users play a role 
in this. To the extent that these groups appear to the outside world as a 
unit, and between themselves use characteristic signs such as distinctive 
clothing or verbal expressions, they display the semiotic characteristics of 
institutions (see definition in 3.1). Though such groups rarely invent en-
tirely new codes, they often contribute decisively to code change within 
specific areas of daily life. Their role is most notably in “life style”-areas 
such as clothing, leisure activities, sports practice, gestures, and daily 
speech and slang. Before such new codes disperse through an entire soci-
ety (during which process they generally mingle with known codes), they 
are frequently used, in a weakened but still discernible version, by a larger 
group of people who sympathize with the “different” style of the original 
“in-group,” without being able to live, speak, and think fully like them. In 
this stage, the larger group is often referred to as a subculture.
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4.1.4. Types of power of interpretation. The discussion up to this point 
may have produced the impression that mentifacts consist, apart from 
inventions, mostly of statements of opinion.
A clarification is therefore in order: In fact, statements in and of them-
selves don’t belong at all to the category of mentifacts; they are texts and 
thus belong to the area of material culture. To draw the distinction pre-
cisely is not easy. What is certain, though, is that the interpretation of the 
world that shows itself in most statements of opinion lies in the sphere of 
mentifacts. An example may be illuminating: When someone is invited to 
give their opinion on a socially relevant question, the utterance itself, its 
diction, its imprint on an audio recording, or its notation in a book, all be-
long to the area of texts. The political, economic, or aesthetic interpreta-
tions expressed in the utterance, however, are mentifacts, since they are 
codes of a particular culture that assign particular signifieds (namely, the 
interpretations) to particular signifiers (namely, the phenomena, events or 
other topics spoken about).
Naturally, statements of opinion are only one of the possible ways to 
create mentifacts through textual production and to spread them with the 
aid of power of interpretation. This also occurs, for example, in the fol-
lowing cases:
–  Someone creates a book which for certain reasons is very widely read, 
and thereby has a lasting influence on the development of a language, 
as Luther did with his translation of the Bible (1521/1534).
–  Someone has a lasting influence on the daily behavior of people 
through a ubiquitous media presence or through his/ her place in the 
canon of important texts,15 as intellectuals, spokespeople, philosophers, 
and television moderators do.
–  Someone invents an artificial language (such as “Volapük”) or a new 
code (such as Shea Zellweger’s “Logic Alphabet”) and attempts to 
spread it using his celebrity.
–  Someone develops a scientific or social theory and attempts to dissemi-
nate it using her position (e.g., a professorship) or through financial 
means.
–  Someone becomes successful in a particular style of art due to critical 
praise.
–  A shaman invents a new myth or alters an old one and causes his peo-
ple to accept it.
–  Someone creates a religious vision and threatens or promises some-
thing to his followers in the name of supposedly God-given authority.
–  Someone, due to a position or financial power, has access to a medium 
and recommends moral values.
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4.2. Power of disposition
4.2.1. Definition
Def: “Power of disposition” is defined as the sum of opportunities a mem-
ber of a particular culture has to access the artifacts and texts of this cul-
ture. The extent of power of disposition someone has depends, on the one 
hand, on the range and intra-cultural importance of the artifacts and texts 
s/ he has access to, on the other hand, on the degree to which s/ he can in-
fluence their use.
Power of disposition is located in the area of material culture.
A note on the role of texts: Texts should be regarded as a sub-category 
of artifacts (cf. Posner 2004: 68) and as such fall in the sphere of power of 
disposition, though within certain limitations. The rights to a text (intellec-
tual property rights) belong in our sense not to the sphere of mentifacts, 
but instead to the sphere of artifacts, since texts are not themselves codes, 
but instead use existing codes. It should be noted, however, that a text can 
become a mentifact to a culture. For example, the pantheon became one of 
Europe’s most influential architectural models and as such a mentifact of 
European culture. Equally, the Faust legend has for many centuries be-
longed to the realm of mental culture in German-speaking countries and as 
such has detached itself from individual texts.16
In capitalist societies, power of disposition is determined to a large ex-
tent by “property.” If I own something, I have complete power of disposi-
tion over it. On the other hand, power of disposition applies even outside 
the sphere of property:
–  “Thief  ” and “robber” are words for someone who gains power of dis-
position over certain artifacts of a culture in disregard of the specific 
laws valid in that culture.
–  The director of a museum has, to a certain extent, power over thearti-
facts (more specifically, these will usually be texts) of her museum. 
The director’s power of disposition is produced by her position (see 
Section 3.2), but is not complete power.17 She can decide which
artifacts are displayed, which are bought, and, in the case of many 
pieces, that they be sold. However, she cannot ordinarily order their 
destruction.
4.2.2. Money and property. In the area of power of disposition, 
capitalist societies have developed the concept of “property,” which 
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provides for complete power of disposition over things (also, with certain 
restrictions, over animals). Money serves as a symbolic representation of 
property; it underwent a process of gradual abstraction from concrete 
property to the symbolic representation of property, beginning with 
precious metals, which were needed in every community and were 
therefore suitable as a means of exchange, through the representation of 
such precious metals by coins and bills which were guaranteed by the 
authorities to be interchangeable for “the real thing” at any time, to 
“currencies,” which are no longer linked to precious metals and are freely 
tradable on the financial markets.
Today, money, the symbol for complete power of disposition, is increas-
ingly electronically represented. Such a representation is only possible if 
its conventionality is absolutely ensured, since otherwise no-one would 
give up their actual physical property: Only in very stable capitalist socie-
ties, is the immaterial figure stored in a computer which designates a bank 
balance considered equal to the actual possession of objects, for example 
of real estate or precious metals. One of the basic concerns of economists 
is to ensure a high level of faith in economic stability, in the absence 
of which people are loath to part with their concrete property for an ab-
stract representation, as witnessed by the psychological effects of major 
depressions.
Since the concept of complete power of disposition has become funda-
mental to capitalist societies, it became necessary to preserve the exercise 
of power of disposition independently of presence, direct intervention, or 
personal supervision. It therefore became one of the state’s primary duties 
to safeguard the power of disposition of its citizens.
The most important task of money, in this process, is to enable the free 
exchange of power of disposition at any time. This exchange is seen as 
necessary condition for the functioning of society. A distinct field of 
knowledge (economics) is occupied with the processes that relate to the 
exchange of power of disposition. In capitalist societies a motivating func-
tion is assigned to power of disposition: The assumption is that the pursuit 
of power of disposition leads many people to undertake activities that are 
beneficial to society. Often, a self-regulating function is also thought to 
exist: It is assumed that those who are especially talented at acquiring 
power of disposition are also those who should exercise it in the interest of 
society.18
4.2.3. Signs for money and property. Money is an abstract symbolic 
concept for power of disposition. As previously explained, it can therefore 
be represented in very different ways, for example with coins, with paper 
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money, or in the form of “electronic payment” as simply a number in a 
computer network.
Equally, there are many forms of representation for property. Land hold-
ings and real estate are marked on the ground with boundary stones; addi-
tionally, they are registered in official documents, such as the “land books” 
in Germany. Unofficial representations of land holdings include fences, 
walls, and locks, which as a rule have a double function: On the one hand 
they prevent access in a direct way (non-semiotic function). On the other, 
they signify a border iconically by retracing it and thereby making it visi-
ble, while at the same time accentuating it by signalling a boundary: “No 
trespassing.” The importance of the semiotic function is obvious in those 
cases where it is enough to mark the border as such, i.e., to make it recog-
nizable with a sign, as witnessed by the existence of those small walls and 
hedges that in villages often mark off front lawns without presenting any 
serious barrier to anyone. These are not necessary against possible claims 
of neighboring landholders or the state, since a symbolic marking (border 
stones, registration in the land books) suffices for this purpose; instead, 
they are intended to visualize an abstract concept, namely, to signal to vis-
itors and outsiders the property rights on that piece of land.
There are also many other forms of property that are symbolically repre-
sented: Financial interests in a business are represented by shares, loans 
given to the state or to a business by government bonds and corporate 
bonds. In the latter case we are dealing with the transfer of power of dis-
position, which is already represented symbolically by money, to an insti-
tution (in our example, the state or a business). Initially, this creates only a 
right to the return of the (proportionally increased) symbolically repre-
sented power of disposition (i.e., money). Only if this does not occur can a 
direct power of disposition over the institution, or over parts of it, be made 
effective. The latter option, though, does not exist today in the case of na-
tional bonds, since no private person can have power of disposition over 
an entire state. In that case, in the event of non-payment, only limited 
rights against a state can be asserted, and even these (as the recent exam-
ple of Argentina bonds has shown to investors) are fraught with difficulties 
in practice.
4.2.4. Types of power of disposition. Power of disposition appears in 
various forms. Let’s start with a recapitulation of the two most important 
varieties:
−  Complete power of disposition is usually designated “property.” In 
capitalist societies this is the most important category, to the extent 
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 27.11.17 16:30
Towards a semiotic theory of power 243
that no area of the central culture19 can be organized without it. In the 
peripheral culture, on the other hand, there are occasionally attempts to 
do without the organization through property. When these attempts are 
perceived as a threat by the most important holders of power of dispo-
sition, they usually attempt to box them off into the area of counter-
culture, as was successfully done in 1950s America.20 Since then, most 
experiments aiming to reduce the importance of property have been 
denounced as “communist” counterculture, regardless of their organi-
zational form being communist or otherwise.
−  Authority derived from a position grants limited power of disposition. 
Thus the manager of a business has a degree of power over the prop-
erty of that business as well as over the products produced by its em-
ployees; should he overstep the bounds of this power, he is considered 
to have committed embezzlement.
However, power of disposition also appears in additional forms:
−  In the public sphere there are usually limiting rules regarding power of 
disposition, designed to prevent the destruction of what is termed 
“public property.” A comparable set of limits holds for the extra- 
cultural sphere of nature and the environment, a sphere, however, 
where our cultural semiotic definition of power is inapplicable in the 
first place.
−  Power of disposition is found in the private sphere as well. Thus mar-
ried couples automatically share power of disposition over property ac-
quired during the marriage unless explicitly stated otherwise in a “mar-
riage contract.” And power of disposition over the fetus is in many 
Western societies given to the mother only until a certain point in its 
development; after this point she loses power of disposition over her 
developing child and in the event of an abortion faces criminal charges.
−  And finally, power of disposition can also be appropriated by violence, 
as states do in wars and private individuals through robbery. Weapons 
grant complete power of disposition because they can realize its worst 
form, the killing of living beings, thereby enabling their holders to 
force all other forms of power of disposition, such as determination 
over possession and behavior of individuals, by threat.
4.3. Power of position
4.3.1. Definition. The area of social culture (society) consists, from a 
semiotic point of view, of a range of sign users. In order to be able to 
analyze power relations, we must examine the structures that govern this 
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sign usage; these are the institutions. We have already defined an institution 
in Section 3.1 as a group of individuals who are in contact with one 
another through regular sign processes and who can interact with the 
outside world as a single sign user (Posner 2004: 66).
How is the connection between institutions and power to be understood? 
Hermann Heller has developed a concept of institutions to deal with this 
question, although he speaks of “organizations” and not of “institutions” 
(Heller 1934: 231–233). Lutz Berthold characterizes it as follows: “The es-
sence of the organization lies [for Heller] in a circular conditional relation-
ship, wherein the power of the organs affects the power of the members 
and the power of the members affects the power of the organs; the out-
come is an increase of the organization’s power, the power of the whole” 
(Berthold 1997: 357).21
The circularity of the power processes in institutions explains how insti-
tutions can accord power to their individual members while at the same 
time themselves gaining power as independent sign users. But how does 
power come to be inside an institution in the first place?
Here we are helped by John Thompson, who for his concept of institu-
tion takes up the Bourdieuian concept of “field of interaction”: A field 
of interaction, for Thompson, is a range of circumstances given in a par-
ticular situation and within which individuals follow their goals (Thomp-
son 1995: 12). Individual people find themselves in various positions 
within these fields. Institutions are thus areas of society where a field of 
interaction remains stable for some time independently of individual peo-
ple: “Institutions give a definite shape to pre-existing fields of interaction 
and, at the same time, they create new positions within these fields, as well 
as new sets of life trajectories for the individuals who occupy them” 
(Thompson 1995: 13).22
The power of a person is thus a product of their position within such 
a field of interaction. We are now in a position to form the following 
definition:
Def: “Individual power of position” is defined as the sum of opportunities 
a member of a specific institution has to attain his/ her goals within that 
institution. “Institutional power of position” is defined as the sum of op-
portunities an institution has to attain its goals in a society.
Power of position is located in the area of social culture.
But how does a position give its holder influence on society as a whole? 
According to Thompson, people, through their positions in institutions, 
gain access to “resources” which they can use in pursuing their goals; we 
might call them means of power. Such means of power are on the one 
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hand the structures, ordinances, and rules within an institution. On the 
other hand, there are means of power which impact society, for example 
media presence, the recognition I receive from a particular position in a 
particular organization, etc. In short, power of position also accords power 
of interpretation and power of disposition to its holder.
4.3.2. Institutions: Inside and outside. We have extended the concept of 
institution to include every group of sign users who regularly interact with 
one another using sign processes and who can interact with the outside 
world as a single sign user. Therefore, not only a family, a church or office 
but also a gang, a subculture or a circle of artists (such as the Brücke 
group) can be considered institutions.
Every person is a member of different institutions. In every institution 
s/ he has a position, which is connected to specific power of position.
We can distinguish two components of individual power of position; the 
first component regards the influence a member has on the institution it-
self. Those who can determine the destiny of the institution possess the 
highest power of this kind. In most organizations certain options are ex-
cluded; thus, the director of a governmental office cannot decide to shut 
that office, and even the Pope himself cannot dissolve the Catholic 
Church.23 Both, however, can decisively influence the development of the 
institution.24
The second, equally important component of individual power of posi-
tion is that which is exercised over other members of the institution. As far 
as power over individual persons is concerned, this component is often 
greater for those who are not at the very top of an institution, but rather 
further down or even directly above the powerless members of the institu-
tion. Thus, a works supervisor often has, in practice if not in theory, much 
greater power over individual workers than any CEO, be it only through 
his constant opportunities to learn their weaknesses, to help or bully them. 
A CEO, on the other hand, often has less power over his direct subordi-
nates than these, in turn, have over their direct subordinates; at the same 
time, he has power over more people than any other person in the corpora-
tion. One of the advantages of rising in an institution consists of the fact 
that while one is still subordinate to higher-ranking people, one is less 
completely so; one gains more “elbow-room.”25
This second component of individual power of position, however, is dis-
tinct from that power which an institution as a whole has over its mem-
bers. This last kind of power is often based on membership itself and is, 
curious as it may sound, not exercised by anyone as power of position. If, 
for example, the Catholic Church denies its members a church wedding 
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after a divorce or if, in Germany, the traffic authority in Flensburg revokes 
a driver’s license after repeated traffic violations, they do according to 
rules, codes, and statutes. Considerable power of position is produced, 
however, when individual people can decide on exceptions to such rules.
But for most members of institutions, that part of intra-institutional 
power that is exercised as power of position is much more tangible than 
the abstract power considered above. In a business, for example, the head 
of a department has, practically speaking, power over a particular part of 
his employees’ lifetimes. He can decide what a small or large group of 
people do in that time. Since human beings are limited in their resources, 
the portion of energy, powers, capacities, and ideas of his employers that 
he can command is often greater than the share of their time he controls. 
In this manner, it is possible for him (within the limits set by predefined 
goals of the institution as well as by the power of position of his superiors) 
to realize his ideas regarding the institution.
A teacher is an example of a member who inside his institution (the 
school) has little individual power of position of the first kind. He cannot 
determine the fate of the school, and cannot even give input to the curricu-
lum that he has to follow. On the other hand, he has power of the second 
kind: power over certain other members of the institution, namely, his stu-
dents. The average teacher will teach several thousand students over the 
course of his career. While doing so he can influence their spiritual and 
moral development (and often has a significant role in it, which can be 
measured by the fact that many people indicate that teachers stimulated 
their interests, helped to shape their outlook on life and influenced their 
career choices). Most importantly, he can evaluate them with grades, which 
are important for the students’ future career options and success in life. 
Naturally, this power is far removed from complete power, since grades 
cannot be given arbitrarily and are given by different teachers in different 
subjects.
Power of position should not be confused with similar concepts utilized 
by institutions themselves, which often serve to strengthen cohesion in the 
institution and to disguise the differences in power of position. A person 
with a position granting little power but which is important for the func-
tion of the institution is often spoken of as holding a “responsible posi-
tion.” “Responsible” means that an error on the part of such individuals 
can have significant results, meaning that they can easily go wrong while 
standing to gain little from doing everything right. Thus, the janitor of a 
business or school, the sexton of a community, the secretaries of a govern-
mental office are responsible for the smooth operation of their organiza-
tions. As opposed to those in “leading” positions, however, they are not 
asked to make decisions. Sentences such as “I’ll leave that to your discre-
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tion!” are characteristically addressed to people in such “responsible” posi-
tions; they mean that the responsibility is being passed down regarding 
how a particular task is to be completed, or how a particular problem is to 
be solved in light of the given necessities or directives. At the same time, 
they are supposed to suggest a transfer (even if limited and temporary) of 
power of position. They sometimes have the result that people are ener-
getically engaged in tasks that they did not themselves choose and which 
they might otherwise not have cared about.
Institutions differ greatly in the amount of power of position they ac-
cord. In the past few decades there have been repeated attempts to find or-
ganizational forms that are less or not at all hierarchical. A key word here 
is flat hierarchy. Though this, as a rule, only means that there should be 
fewer levels of hierarchy, which can in turn also lead to a greater depen-
dency of the lower-ranked persons on those in power.
It has become clear that every institution develops informal hierarchies, 
even if it is a clique of friends, a music group, an alternative housing proj-
ect, or any other institution nominally based on equality between all mem-
bers. Where hierarchies are not pre-set, they frequently develop on their 
own, and projects focusing on parity have often realized that they must 
develop specific behavioral guidelines that prevent the formation of power 
structures.
4.3.3. Rights. Being a part of an institution is often connected with 
certain rights that are independent of position. An example: If a member of 
a Christian church decides to marry in church or have their children 
baptized, the priest or pastor cannot arbitrarily decide to refuse. In many 
institutions, membership is connected with such rights. Rights, however, 
must be differentiated from power, for the following reasons:
1. Power always has an asymmetrical component (cf. definition in 2.2). 
If everyone is allowed to do a particular thing, we normally don’t 
speak of power but rather of a right, even if this right is dependent on 
imposing upon another person. If I can demand something of you that 
you can also demand of me at any time, there is no power relation.
  The same is true if everyone is able to do a particular thing. For 
example, during the Cold War the two “superpowers,” the USA and 
the USSR, had power over the rest of the world (which justifies the 
designation as superpowers) but not over one another. Power is the 
sum of opportunities someone has for imposing his/ her will on some-
one else, something which the adversaries didn’t have as regards 
each other. Usually, the expression “balance of power” is used for 
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characterizing the relationship between the two opponents; in the 
sense of our definition, “powerlessness” is more precise.
2. Power is never as specific as rights are, it always means that one can 
impose one’s will on someone, even if this is only true in certain pre-
defined limits, as in the case of the manager who can determine what I 
do during my working hours but not during the rest of the day. In the 
timeframe inscribed into his power, however, he can choose from a 
potentially infinite repertoire of tasks for me; in this sense, he really 
can impose his will on me, even though some tasks are excluded 
through employment rights. The engaged couple, on the other hand, 
cannot impose their will on the priest in any way; they do not even 
have power over the sermon he will hold on the day of the event, and 
therefore should take care not to irritate him too much with their de-
mands! They can only choose between two paths that are open to them 
as members of the institution “church”: to marry or not to marry. 
Rights are specific and therefore different from power; they do not
allow me to freely realize my ideas, but merely protect me to a spe-
cific extent from the power of others. Rights limit the power of others.
Rights are also frequently used as a substitution for power; they replace 
participation in power and ease the powerlessness of the dominated. An 
important example of this is the modern parliamentary democracy: A com-
mon argument used against the few contemporary critics of this system 
(such as Johannes Agnoli)26 states that it is still “on the whole much bet-
ter” than, for example, a monarchy. This advancement alone is supposed to 
show the strengths of democracy. In point of fact, the well-being of most 
citizens of a modern Western democracy is much higher than in the time 
of the monarchies, but this can be assigned less to an increase in the power 
of the citizens than to an increase in their rights.27
For average citizens, the numerous rights that they possess do in fact 
affect their daily lives and significantly reduce their feelings of powerless-
ness (especially the rights which limit the power of the judiciary, the po-
lice, the government, and the bureaucracy vis-à-vis the citizens of a state, 
as well as the rights to services in particular areas, such as schools, univer-
sities, welfare or public transport). On the other hand, many citizens have 
ceased to care about affecting government through elections and consider 
this a senseless undertaking, as the long-standing downward trend in voter 
participation shows. For an adequate treatment of topics like these, the dif-
fering properties of power and rights have to be taken into account.
4.3.4. Institutional power of position and its signs. Individual power
of position, which originates inside an institution but often emanates 
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into society as well, is displayed through a large range of signs: the titles 
of people in different institutions; the stripes of generals, decorations, 
and medals in the military; the letterheads and stamps of authorities, 
universities, and businesses.
A somewhat more complex case regards the power of position institu-
tions have in a society. It often expresses itself in documents that are de-
clared “official,” such as identity cards, passports or the license plates of 
cars. Here one can speak of signs that not only mark power of position it-
self, but also facilitate its exercise. For example, only the police can de-
mand of someone that they show their identity card, in Germany they even 
possess the right to temporarily arrest anyone who cannot produce an iden-
tity card. The card can thus be understood as an identity marker that serves 
to make every person reliably identifiable. This identity marker is then 
linked with specific data storage systems such as the “criminal record,” 
which can be produced to examine the conduct of the respective person.
Connected to this is the system of “police registration” ( polizeiliche An-
meldung), according to which in Germany every person is forced to de-
clare a fixed place of residence. Anyone who does not declare a place of 
residence or declares a false one can be punished. This is a system of loca-
tion control, which is supposed to enable the police to find any person they 
want to find. Identity markers and location controls are closely related to 
one another, since the latter is of little use without the first. For this reason 
it makes sense that in the USA, where there is no obligation to carry an 
identity card, there is also no location control.
Both of these legal obligations are cases of power of position that is 
granted to the institution “police” by the constitution or the law. Other 
rules regulate the power of position of the government, military, churches, 
etc. Businesses also have a considerable power of position in society, be-
cause they have, for example, the ability to fire people. The objection 
could be raised that this is not power, since it belongs to the realm of con-
tractual freedom as in the case that I sell a product to someone, where both 
I and my customer are free to end the contract at any time. Such a view, 
however, overlooks the fact that power presents the opportunity of impos-
ing one’s will on someone due to a structural asymmetry of the situation. 
Such an asymmetry is present here, since the employee is dependent on his 
job for his salary — a dependency which becomes greater the less his 
chance of finding other employment — whereas the dependency is consid-
erably less in the opposite direction.28
What all of these institutions have in common is that their power of po-
sition is expressed within the society through signs, albeit in differing 
forms. Churches, for example, have the right to call for their services 
through the ringing of bells, whereas mosques realize the same right 
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through the muezzin. Today, the churches cannot impose sanctions on non-
attendees, whereas in the nineteenth century is could exercise considerable 
power and in extreme cases could prevent people from marrying or endan-
ger their careers.
In the case of companies, their power of position is difficult to deter-
mine, since it works differently towards different members of society. For 
example, companies have a high degree of power over their employees, 
whereas they have little power over other people; only large businesses 
have power over the government of a country, but this power can be sig-
nificant, as shown by the concessions (subsidies, special conditions, prop-
erty grants) that companies acquire for themselves using it. For the indi-
viduals of a society not employed by it, the power of position of a company 
mostly consists in the monopolization of discourse. Thus, for example, an 
individual cannot say what s/ he wants about a company; the use of a com-
pany’s trademarks and logos is especially limited, so that the average 
member of a society is influenced by publicity without being able to recip-
rocate. Here, institutional power of position imparts power of interpreta-
tion. In this way, companies dominate the discourse, i.e., the discussion in 
the public space conducted through the media, about an increasingly im-
portant part of a culture (products, trademarks, events, as well as compa-
nies themselves and what they stand for). Advertising and publicity them-
selves belong to the sphere of power of interpretation.
4.3.5. Types of power of position. We have already distinguished 
between two components of individual power of position (4.3.2) and 
institutional power of position (4.3.4). A further differentiation is possible 
according to centrality of institutions. There is a systematic connection 
between individual power of position within institutions of different 
centrality and the power of interpretation in the society resulting from it. 
One can distinguish between power of position
(a)  in an institution in the centre of the dominant social order (in a sec-
ular Western society this would be an institution belonging to the 
sphere organized by the state, such as the government, administra-
tion, parliament, police, or judiciary), which grants a high level of 
power of interpretation,29
(b)  in an institution that is recognized by society and that therefore ac-
cords a certain level of power of interpretation (companies, churches, 
theatres and orchestras, successful bands or soccer clubs),
(c)  in an institution that is neither recognized nor ostracized and that 
therefore does not possess any societal power of interpretation (little 
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known institutions of all descriptions, such as most artist groups, or-
ganizations, political and interest groups etc.; private groups of peo-
ple, such as a close-knit “gang” of friends),
(d)  in an institution that is ostracized and therefore accords negative 
power of interpretation30 (for example a criminal organization, a rad-
ical political group or the demimonde).
The categories given encompass the most common cases; but since 
power of position is a universal phenomenon, several slightly less obvious 
examples might be helpful:
– A tribal elder or shaman has power of interpretation among his people 
because he is accorded more authority than other members of the tribe 
in questions of tribal politics, dispute settlements, or invocation of 
higher beings.
– Even in situations thought to be egalitarian, power of position often 
crops up, as for example in the case of roommates when only one resi-
dent signs the lease, the others becoming subtenants,31 in which case 
that roommate has to represent the others in negotiations with the land-
lord but can also threaten to kick them out of the apartment.
– Both power of position and power of interpretation were involved 
when, in the days before the widespread use of telephones, the owner 
of the only phone in a rural village (often the grocer or the parson) 
commanded the fastest means of contact with the outside world (power 
of position) and could therefore choose to share news or not (power of 
interpretation).
4.3.6. Power in groups and families. A complex and non-intuitive case 
concerns the processes of spokesmanship, disagreement, and alliance 
formation that permanently take place inside of any group of people. Such 
processes are discussed under the heading of “group dynamics” (Kurt 
Lewin) and are often considered to be small-scale reproductions of social 
power relations. In the sense of our definition, however, most of these 
processes are not about power; they are neither based on it nor are they 
“power struggles,” as group dynamics would have it.
We defined power as the sum of opportunities of a person to impose 
his/ her will due to a structural asymmetry in a given situation (cf. 2.2). For 
that reason, we have to distinguish between the structure of a situation and 
different characteristics of people. Questions of leadership in a group, 
however, are mostly not based on a structural asymmetry of the situation 
and therefore cannot be called power in our sense. That some people are 
more dominant than others, have more social skills or are more outspoken 
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is not, in our sense, a question of power. However, in many groups there 
are structural asymmetries, they already start out with different roles as-
signed to different people. In companies or factories, people have different 
assignments; in a group of friends, some might have a car, etc. So in prac-
tice, power structures crop up in most groups.
In families, the major power relation exists between parents and 
children — a relation of nearly complete power that was only recently mit-
igated by giving the children certain rights. Again, relations of control be-
tween siblings, except sometimes due to age differences, cannot be said to 
be power, since they are mostly not rooted in a structural asymmetry of the 
situation and can be influenced by the children themselves.
A borderline case concerns “unwritten rules.” These can lie in the do-
main of “group dynamics,” as for example in the case of a shared apart-
ment in which the most senior resident traditionally has the right to move 
into the room of someone who has just moved out. It can also, however, 
lie in the domain of real power relations, as when fraternities impose hu-
miliating rituals on freshmen. The distinction can be drawn depending on 
whether sanctions are imposed when unwritten rules are broken.32
5.  Delimitation between the three types of power
5.1. Power of interpretation versus power of position
It might initially seem as if the borderline between power of position and 
power of interpretation were blurred, allowing the two types of power to 
blend into one another. This impression can be explained by the fact that 
power of position almost always leads to a degree of power of interpreta-
tion (within and often outside of the respective institution). Once this is 
taken into account, it becomes clear that the two types of power can be 
clearly separated from each other.
5.1.1. Power of position grants power of interpretation. This is true
(a)  within an institution: A member of an institution is generally awarded 
more attention the higher his position. In a business, a manager is 
more likely to determine which letterhead, which logo, or which new 
advertising campaign the company will use: He has power over the 
codes of the business. In a gang or subculture, the leaders decide 
what is “cool” and “uncool”; semiotically speaking, they specify 
which codes are accepted and used by the institution in areas such as 
clothing, music or slang.
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(b)  outside of an institution: Here a qualification is necessary. Individuals 
who possess power of position in a particular institution have power 
of interpretation in society at large only to the extent that their insti-
tution has power of interpretation in the society (cf. 4.3.5). In this 
category a further distinction is required between individual power of 
interpretation and the power of interpretation people exercise on be-
half of their institution; cf. (c) below.
 Individual power of interpretation reveals itself, on the one hand, 
in the fact that those who possess it can express personal opinions 
that vary from the official position of the institution; known as “unof-
ficial statements” which are given by a “private individual.” In this 
case, however, it is important to remember that the person was only 
asked her opinion in the first place because of her power of position 
within the institution. Typical examples of such a situation are talk 
shows or interviews, where a targeted attempt is often made to elicit 
personal opinions differing from the official positions of the respec-
tive institution in order to get attention and generate copy. On the 
other hand, individual power of interpretation shows itself when indi-
viduals are asked to voice an opinion in areas that have nothing to do 
with their respective institutions.
(c)  An institution as a whole usually has power of interpretation in a spe-
cific area: sports associations and NGOs, churches and research insti-
tutions are usually consulted only in matters relating to their area of 
activity; the word “consulted” is specifically used to indicate this.
When a society grants particular institutions considerable power of in-
terpretation, the result is sometimes called Expertokratie (“expertocracy”); 
the term is mostly used pejoratively but has a factual basis that is value-
free, namely, that whenever an event or a problem is discussed, the opin-
ions of individuals from such institutions to whom society grants power of 
interpretation in the respective field are foregrounded. In such a system, it 
does not harm an expert to argue superficially or to repeat clichés, some-
times it is even seen as their job to espouse a particular opinion (as in the 
case of lobby groups) regardless of whether there are good arguments to 
support it, whereas to be well-informed about a particular field doesn’t 
help normal citizens to gain influence.33
5.1.2. Power of position without power of interpretation. Power of 
position usually but not necessarily entails power of interpretation. Rather, 
it is characterized precisely by the fact that its holders are independent in 
their decisions of the approval of others, and in particular of those affected.
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In Germany, the Habilitation (postdoctoral lecture qualification) has to 
be approved by all professors of the relevant department. Should one of 
them not concur, Habilitation will not be granted. This is true regardless of 
the reasons given, which can be completely specious. The same holds true 
anywhere where members of a governing body possess veto power. It 
doesn’t matter then whether the members are generally respected or 
whether they have possibly long since forfeited their power of interpreta-
tion due to personal error or mediocre performance.
An example is the American Supreme Court. In this court, which is far 
more powerful than the highest court in Germany (the Verfassungsgericht) 
since it can voluntarily take up landmark cases, the judges are appointed 
for life by the President of the USA. Even when such a judge throws away 
his acceptance among the judicial community and the populace, i.e., his 
power of interpretation, through barely justifiable decisions, he can still 
exercise the same power of position as his possibly more competent 
colleagues.
5.2. Power of interpretation versus power of disposition
These two types of power are relatively easy to separate from each other, 
but a few comments regarding their mutual influence are in order.
The conversion of power of interpretation into power of disposition is 
the goal of regulations such as patent registration and trademarks. They are 
supposed to make it possible for individuals to obtain, through the inven-
tion of new mentifacts, control over the artifacts and texts that use them. 
As a rule, such rights are limited in time because legislators recognize that 
cultural progress would otherwise be slowed down.
Authorial rights, i.e., the idea that a text such as a book, film or song is 
to be regarded as “intellectual property,” can be used to clarify further the 
border between power of interpretation and power of disposition. Accord-
ing to our definition, a text in and of itself belongs to the area of material 
culture where the concept “property” holds. Frequently, however, it also 
has an aspect that belongs to mental culture: When literary, filmic or other 
texts introduce, for example, a new type of hero (say, the “comical anti-
hero”),34 a new narrative perspective, or a new mode of presentation, they 
have invented aesthetic codes, which belong to the area of secondary 
codes. If an author is successful in creating a new language (as George 
Orwell attempted in 1984, J. R. R. Tolkien in his Middle Earth novels and 
Anthony Burgess in A clockwork orange), he has even created a primary 
code. In fact, the aspect of a text which falls into the area of mental cul-
ture is usually not protected; an author who creates a new genre, intro-
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duces a new style or coins a neologism, cannot usually prevent others from 
using these in their texts, a notable exception being certain aspects of fic-
tion like characters, names, and settings.
5.3. Power of disposition versus power of position
Power of position often involves a certain power of disposition. A typical 
example is the director of a museum (see 4.2.1) who, to a certain extent, 
has power over the works of art in “her” museum (the possessive pronoun 
being used for the area in which the power of position of a person holds). 
The example also shows that in the case of power of disposition, the dif-
ferentiation according to the number of possibilities available, ranging 
from “special power of disposition” to “complete power of disposition,” is 
especially important. This differentiation, however, is equally to be main-
tained in the case of power of position and power of interpretation; in the 
case of the latter it swings between the poles of someone’s statement being 
cited, but designated “mere opinion,” and the “absolute stipulation,” ex-
amples for which include the “infallibility of the Pope” when speaking ex 
cathedra and the ukase of the Russian tsar.
For complete power of disposition, capitalist societies developed the 
concept of “property” (see 4.2.2). In order to facilitate the free exchange 
of property, money was developed as its symbolic representation. One can 
therefore, in these societies, reliably distinguish incomplete power of dis-
position attained through power of position from complete power of dispo-
sition utilizing the fact that the latter can almost always be freely con-
verted with the help of money, while the former as a rule “cannot be 
bought”: one can only attain it with the help of a position in an institution.
6.  Conclusion
In this paper, three types of power were defined on the basis of cultural 
semiotics, further differentiated according to their properties and delimi-
tated from each other and related concepts such as “authority.” The typol-
ogy of power presented here is certainly not the only one possible, but it 
has two important advantages: On the one hand, it builds on basic con-
cepts of cultural semiotics, linking a social analysis of power with a clari-
fication of its semiotic foundations; on the other hand, it can be used to 
analyze the full range of power phenomena and to explain many of their 
differences. In the introduction, we examined three examples that would 
normally fall under the heading of “power.” Returning to them now, we 
recognize them as examples of the three types of power:
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1. In the case of (a) the state president or (b) the well-known per- 
sonality whose utterance generates a significant media response re-
gardless of its argumentative quality, we are dealing with power of
interpretation.
2. In the case of the billionaire who builds a luxury residence, in the pro-
cess claiming a piece of land for herself, using artifacts and deciding 
over time and skills of many people, we are dealing with power of 
disposition.
3. In the case of the manager who fires or hires 10,000 employees and 
thereby significantly influences their lives, we are dealing with power 
of position.
It is clear that we are truly dealing with differing power phenomena 
from the fact that they can be systematically differentiated by their charac-
teristics, as demonstrated in the introduction. In Sections 4.1 through 4.3, 
the three main types of power and their characteristics were examined in 
more detail; in Sections 5.1 through 5.3 it was shown that a precise de-
limitation between them is possible. The suggested semiotic description of 
power concentrates on the sociological side of power; the aspects related 
to psychology and action theory are not considered. It seems to me, how-
ever, that they could be profitably examined on the basis of the theory out-
lined here. Most of all, I hope to have shown how closely the semiotic 
foundations of culture are connected to the important phenomenon of in-
terpersonal control we are wont to call power.
Notes
 * This paper is intended as a first step towards a general semiotic theory of power. I’m 
indebted to Roland Posner, whose elegant and clear-cut semiotic theory of culture is the 
basis for the work presented here.
 1. In this edict of 1598 Henry IV granted French Protestants the right to practice their reli-
gion, ending the period of their persecution.
 2. In this edict of 1685 Louis XIV repealed the Edict of Nantes. Many Protestants fled to 
other countries, where they were called “Huguenots.”
 3. There will be less power exercised in this case because the persons newly hired will 
have previously decided to apply for the job, and the subsequent changes in their living 
conditions will have been accounted for. The influence of the decision to hire can be the 
same as that of the decision to fire, in the number of affected lives as well as in the de-
gree of the effect in each case. However, the power that is exercised is significantly less 
due to the cooperation of the individuals concerned.
 4. In Germany, a vote out of office is impossible in the case of the president; in the case of 
the Federal Chancellor, it is possible when a new one is elected at the same time (a 
process called konstruktives Misstrauensvotum).
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 5. Since this power is based on the attention of the media, it can be increased by a pro-
vocative statement, but only if this statement is not too absurd or outlandish, which 
could lead to decreased “quotability” of the person for the media.
 6. Citations from the German text (Weber 1956 [1922], my translation).
 7. In fact, this narrow concept of rule (understood here as “state power”) has prevented 
sociologists for a long time from considering indirect power mechanisms. Implicitly, it 
was presupposed that “Where there’s no command, there’s no rule.” It would be better, 
however, to gauge the amount of state power present in a given form of government 
or political system by looking at the amount of control it has over the life of the indi-
vidual, be it directly (e.g., via commands and laws) or indirectly (e.g., via economic 
pressures or the control over private life).
 8. The concept “mentifact,” in the present article, is intended to be somewhat more com-
prehensive than the concept in Posner (2004), since it includes not only codes, but also 
certain conventional characteristics of their usage. The product of the use of a code is 
always a text (see Posner 2004: 68–70); certain characteristics of such a text, however, 
which cannot be inferred from the usage of the code but are not accidental either, 
should, in my opinion, be included in the category of mentifact. A mentifact, thus, is 
created when someone finds a new way to use a code and to create a text: Examples 
might be a new painting technique (e.g., fresco), a new concept in sculpture (e.g., 
“ready-made”), a new literary style (“stream of consciousness”) or a new method in 
theatre (“epic theatre”) or acting (“method-acting”). Ideas like these can in no way be 
inferred from the codes in the respective areas themselves, but are in fact extensions of 
the possibilities of using these codes; they could, however, be said to interact with the 
codes by proposing new ways of using them which might, later on, become convention-
alised and even internalised in the codes. Therefore, to include these ideas in the con-
cept of mentifact makes sense because they are true creations of the mind whereas, for 
cultural semiotics, the simple use of a code is not such a creation. These specific menti-
facts, however, can be called “secondary codes” (of which “aesthetic codes” are a sub-
set), which are based on primary codes by connecting specific ways of using them (as 
signifiers) with specific meanings (as signifieds).
 Apart from these systematic questions, we gain the further advantage of being able to 
classify artistic and scientific ideas under the concept of “mentifact.” In defining “power 
of interpretation” (see 4.1.1) we would otherwise have had to include phenomena like 
the construction of a new formal language (which is a code) or the definition of new 
concepts (which are elements of codes) in our definition, since these would be menti-
facts, but to exclude others such as the development of a new mathematic formula or 
artistic method such as “stream of consciousness” (both not new codes, but new ways 
of using a code), since these wouldn’t be mentifacts. This definition would be unrealis-
tic in view of scientists and artists constantly mixing both forms of creativity whereas 
the simple use of a given code in a given way (let’s say, in school) is usually excluded 
from the definition of “science” or “art.” Also, it would ignore the fact that ways of 
using a code often are adopted by other people who form an artistic, scientific or philo-
sophic “school,” and might finally become conventionalised and be taught in normal 
schools like the primary codes they rest on (languages; arithmetic; mathematical logic; 
musical notation and harmony; etc.). These similarities are captured in the definition as 
“secondary codes.”
 9. The paper of a manuscript or the air that carries the vibrations of my voice are both also 
media. The former belongs to the technological media concept, the second to the phys-
ical media concept (see Posner 2004: 61). Considering the access to these media is also 
of course relevant to a theory of power. A comprehensive concept of media as proposed 
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by Posner gives us the potential to describe power relations as they occur in the interac-
tion between disabled and non-disabled individuals, between locals and foreigners, or 
between illiterate and literate people (the last two examples with the aid of the code- 
related concept of media, which sees local languages or scripts as mediums).
 10. At the same time they are considered by many societies to be “objectively real and 
true.” While the conventionality of values in a society was comparatively easy to under-
stand, the same recognition took an especially long time with regard to concepts.
 11. There it might be impossible for a girl to reject the husband chosen for her on the 
grounds of his “saying stupid things” (lack of natural authority), but possible on the 
grounds of his “being below her station” (lack of status).
 12. Naomi Klein discusses these problems and positions, among others, in her book
No logo (Klein 2000). Though it is often thought to be the “manifesto of the anti-
globalization movement,” the book is primarily a journalistic portrayal of the first years 
of the movement, together with some in-depth analysis of the reasons it came into being 
and its foremost topics and strategies. It also gives an account of the trend to “brand-
ing,” which became pervasive in the 1990s. Concerning the problem of branding and 
artistic freedom, Klein describes how artists in the USA, working in a postmodern 
culture of eclecticism and citation, do not have the same opportunities to realize their 
artistic vision; thus, artists who sign with multinational companies are able to ex-
periment freely and let the lawyers clear each and every sample they use, whereas 
freelance artists doing the same thing have to work “illegally” and might face severe 
consequences.
 13. The Canadian quarterly “Adbusters” publishes “enhanced” versions of well-known ad-
vertisements, reports new fakes and “embellishments” of billboards. Semiotically speak-
ing, the critique of Adbusters aims at the one-way flow of information in advertising 
and publicity; they postulate a loss of public space and a deterioration of the “mental 
environment,” which could be translated to “mental culture.” All the activities described 
above, as well as “flash mobs,” “Google bombing,” and politically motivated fakes (e.g. 
forged parking tickets for SUVs), are examples of “Culture Jamming,” which could be 
described as subversive, disconcerting, and often illegal attempts to reclaim “mental 
culture” from those imbued with power of interpretation, done by and for people who, 
without Culture Jamming, would have no power of interpretation.
 14. For the same reason, its generality, Radeberger failed to get it protected as a trademark 
(Bundespatentgericht, Beschluss vom 14.05.1997, 26 W (PAT) 7/97, GRUR 1998, 57).
 15. For a discussion of the centrality of codes to a society see Posner (2004: 78–81).
 16. At the same time, there were individual texts that were crucial to the formation of this 
mentifact, such as the anonymous “Historia von D. Johann Fausten, dem weitbeschrey-
ten Zauberer vnnd Schwartzkünstler” of 1587” (the so-called “Faustbook” that became 
Goethe’s main source).
 17. I use the concept “complete power of disposition” for a kind of power in which every 
possibility of disposition is included. The term “absolute power,” which is typically 
used for absolute monarchies, wasn’t adapted, since it is semantically linked to a type 
of rule. This type of rule is not necessarily combined with complete power of the ruler. 
An absolute monarch, under certain circumstances, might be lacking some possibilities, 
because they might provoke a coup of the military; in this case he doesn’t have com-
plete power. Because of its connection with a type of rule, absolute power, if used for 
power of disposition (the power over artefacts), sounds rather metaphorical.
 18. In German the equation of power of disposition with achievement or quality is reflected 
in a number of expressions such as verdienen (“to earn” and “to merit”) or Verdienst 
(“earnings” and “merit”) for receiving power of disposition or wertvoll (“valuable” and 
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“estimable”) for something that can be exchanged for a significant amount of power of 
disposition.
 19. For the concepts “culturally central” (zentralkulturell ), peripher kulturell (culturally pe-
ripheral), and gegenkulturell (counter-cultural), see Posner (2004: 75).
 20. This example can be used to demonstrate the connection between power of disposition 
and power of interpretation. Wherever the distribution of one type of power shows a 
close correlation to the other, there will be little chance of reducing the importance of 
power of disposition in a society. In the case of 1950s America and the McCarthy era, 
the privatization of the relatively new media radio and television (cf. McChesney 1993) 
played an important role in the general circulation of the “red scare.”
 21. “Das Wesen der Organisation liegt [f  ür Heller] in einem zirkulären Bedingungs-
zusammenhang, bei dem die Macht der Organe die Macht der Mitglieder und die 
Macht der Mitglieder wiederum die Macht der Organe bewirkt, wobei das Ergebnis eine 
Steigerung der Organisationsmacht, also der Macht des Ganzen, ist” (Berthold 1997: 
357).
 22. Thompson goes on to give the following definition of power: “In the most general 
sense, power is the ability to act in pursuit of one’s aims and interests, the ability to in-
tervene in the course of events and to affect their outcome” (1995: 13).
 23. At least, none of them seems to have tried.
 24. A major difference between “established churches” and those called sects can be seen
in the fact that only the leaders of the latter (sometimes called “gurus”) have the power 
to dissolve the institution. This may be an important part of the meaning of the word 
“established.”
 25. Notable exceptions are extremely hierarchic organizations, e.g., totalitarian states; there, 
the degree of subordination is nearly the same on every level.
 26. Agnoli diagnoses an “involution” of modern democracy, a kind of degenerative process 
which causes a regression from liberal and progressive beginnings to a consolidation of 
new power structures only superficially covered by democratic elements, finally thwart-
ing the ideals with which democracy began (cf. Agnoli 1990).
 27. The factual powerlessness of the people became obvious when England, Italy and Spain 
participated in the Iraq war in 2003. In all three countries seventy or eighty percent of 
the population in polls had voiced their opposition to the participation. The decision to 
go to war, however, might well be the most important decision a state can make; when 
it is decided in clear opposition to the people, the application of the word “democracy” 
becomes inconsistent.
 28. In special cases, the dependency of an employer on an employee may be greater than 
the other way around, for example if the employee is a much sought after specialist in a 
certain area whom the employer could hardly replace.
 29. It might be objected that the membership in such an institution may, under certain cir-
cumstances, accord less recognition than in the private or cultural sector; for example, 
famous artists or leading intellectuals often are more popular than politicians or judges. 
This fact, however, is readily explained with the important differentiation between 
power of interpretation and natural authority (cf. 3.1). Important politicians have great 
power of interpretation because the media reports their views independently of the qual-
ity their arguments and thinking show. Intellectuals or artists, on the other hand, will 
only be visible in the media when they have already gained a reputation in a certain 
area; they have natural authority in that area. But natural authority plays a role in poli-
tics, too, when for example a parliamentarian is asked because s/ he is known to be an 
expert for the topic in question. More important, however, is power of interpretation, 
which can be seen by the fact that a chancellor, president or chairman will be asked 
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more frequently for their opinion than a normal parliamentarian, independently of their 
respective areas of expertise.
 30. Negative power of interpretation can be said to exist when a sign user is discouraged 
and/or deterred from distributing mentifacts as a part of his culture’s mentality. Nega-
tive power of interpretation is present in society, for example, when someone is only 
quoted by the media with insinuations not to take him seriously, in negative contexts, or 
followed by opposing statements. Negative power of interpretation also exists inside of 
institutions, as when theatre critics are suspicious of an actress because she played in 
soap operas before, which actually makes it harder for her to succeed.
 31. In German Wohngemeinschaften (flat-sharing communities) this is often practiced for 
technical reasons.
 32. I understand a “sanction” to be outside the socially accepted range of negative reactions 
in human interaction, examples for the latter being hostility, sulking, brushing off and 
also (at least until a certain age is reached) brawls and fights. Understood in this sense, 
“to shower someone with urine” would be a sanction, whereas “to ignore him/ her for 
weeks” wouldn’t be, although it may be intended as a punishment, too. People will al-
ways show a negative reaction if they feel disregarded, but usually they will do this in 
the limits of what is culturally accepted as “normal behavior” depending on age, sex, 
and social standing. As a rule, they will overstep these limits only when safeguarded by 
power relations. In the absence of power, every measure I take against someone might 
be reciprocated, so I have good reason to avoid escalation.
 33. Since the informational capacity of the media has multiplied in the last years, non-
specialists are increasingly often asked their opinion. Thus, power of position is no 
longer a necessary condition for an opportunity once in a while to distribute your 
mentifacts, be these ideas, plans, theories, opinions or otherwise. However, it is still 
crucial for the value attached to the respective mentifacts: A brilliant theory or argument 
voiced by a “nobody” in a talk show will probably be cited less frequently than a 
superficial statement from a person with power of position (a top manager, director or 
anchorman).
 34. Such an introduction can be attributed to Cervantes’ Don Quixote.
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